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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

S·TATE OF UTAH

D.A.V. CHAPTER NO. 6; AMERICAN
LEGION POST 60; THE KENT CLUB;
THE M. & B. CLUB, INC.; D.A.V.
CHAPTER NO. 11; CLUB LAUREE,
all non-profit corporations,
P laintiIfs,
-vs.-

No. 8341

SECRETARY OF STATE OF THE
STATE OF UTAH; LA1fONT F.
TORONTO, duly elected official to the
above office,
Defendant.

DEFENDANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF FACTS
We adopt the plaintiffs Statement of Facts and
concede that they are substantiapy correct.
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STATE~IENT

OF POINTS

POINT I
THE STATES OF THE UNION, UNDER THE TWENTYFIRST AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES, HAVE EXCLUSIVE CONTROL OVER
THE SALE, TRANSPORTATION, CONSUMPTION, STORAGE, ETC., OF ALCOHOLI·C BEVERAGES.
POINT II
HOUSE BILL 16 IS NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND
IS NOT IN VIOLATION OF ARTICLE VI, SECTION 23 OF
THE CONSTITUTION OF UTAH.
POINT III
HOUSE BILL 16 IS NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS BEING IN VIOLATION OF ARTICLE I, SECTION 24, AND
ARTICLE VI, SECTION 26, SUBDIVISION 16, OF THE CONSTITUTION OF UTAH OR OF SECTION 1 OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES.
POINT IV
HOUSE BILL 16 IS NOT INVALID UNDER THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT, SECTION 1, OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, SINCE. IT IS NOT UNCERTAIN, AMBIGUOUS OR INCAPABLE OF ENFORCEMENT.
POINT V
HOUSE BILL 16 IS CONSTITUTIONAL UNDER ARTICLE V OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF
UTAH AND IS NOT AN INVALID DELEGATION OF A
JUDICIAL FUNCTION.
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3
POINT VI
HOUSE BILL 16 DOES NOT VIOLATE ARTI·CLE I,
SECTION 18, UTAH ·CONSTITUTION, IN THAT IT DOES
NOT IMP AIR THE OBLIGATION OF CONTRACTS.

POINT VII
HOUSE BILL 16 IS NOT CONTRARY TO ARTICLE I,
SECTION 9, CONSTITUTION OF UTAH, IN THAT IT DOES
NOT PROVIDE FOR AN EX·CESSIVE AND UNREASONABLE FINE UPON A LIMITED GROUP.

ARGU11ENT

POINT I
THE STATES OF THE UNION, UNDER THE TWENTYFIRST AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES, HAVE EXCLUSIVE CONTROL OVER
THE SALE, TRANSPORTATION, CONSUMPTION, STORAGE, ETC., OF ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGES.

House Bill 16 is a legislative measure, the purpose
of which is to regulate and control certain nonprofit
corporations of the State of Utah. In addition to regulating and controlling these particular corporations, the
bill confers upon them special privileges which no other
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corporation or legal entity is granted. Why is this particular type or kind of corporation so regulated and controlled and at the smne time granted special privileges T
An examination of House Bill 16 discloses the answer
to this question. Any social club, recreational or athleti~
association incorporated as a nonprofit organization,
which "maintains or intends to maintain premises upon
which liquor is or will be stored or consumed'' and only
these particular nonprofit corporations are subject to
regulation and control and are the recipients of the
granted privileges set forth in this bill. Thus, nonprofit
corporations are further subdivided into a more limited
classification consisting only of those upon whose premises liquor is to be stored or consumed. This classification is neither ambiguous nor unreasonahle.
It is assumed much of the time that a corporation
cannot be restrained nor controlled within the limits of
the law. However, a corporation is a creature of the
state and exists solely by sufferance of the state. A
corporation has no privilege or right, except as determined by the sovereign creating it, or permitting its
creation and existence. The courts throughout the states
support this first point overwhelmingly. See Keetch v.
Cordner (1936), 90 Utah 423,62 P. 273.
The case of Keetch v. Cordner, supra, is consistent
with Article XII, Section 1 of the Constitution of the
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State of Vtah which reads as follows:
"Corporations may be formed under general
laws, but shall not be created by special acts. All
laws relating to corporations may be altered,
amended or repealed by the Legislature, and all
corporations doing business in this state may, as
to such business, be regulated, limited or restrained by the law."
Plaintiffs complain that they are to be required to
procure and file a bond, file their constitutions and bylaws, membership lists and leases, to limit the number
of members consistent with the purpose and nature of
the club, to establish reasonable dues and initiation fees
consistent with the nature and purpose of the club or
association, to establish reasonable regulations for the
dropping of members for nonpayment of dues, to establish strict regulations for the government of club rooms
and quarters consistent with the nature and character
of the club. BUT plaintiffs are only required to do these
things if they now maintain or intend to maintain prem-

ises upon which liquor is or will be stored or consumed.
And, if plaintiffs meet the requirements enumerated in
House Bill 16, they (such nonprofjt corporations) are
given and granted the exclusive right to operate the
so-called "locker system" for the storage and serving
of intoxicating liquors and may also hold a federal retail
malt revenue stamp.
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Thus, the State of Utah has chosen nonprofit corporations as the only entity or organization which is to
be permitted to allow the storage, consumption and serving of liquors pursuant to the so-called "locker system."
Does the imposition of the foregoing requirements
and the granting of this exclusive privilege deny or offend any of plaintiffs' legal or constitutional rights Y We
believe not and shall cite court decisions to prove our
position.
Prior to the Eighteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, state authority over the liquor
business was virtually supreme and state legislatures
could regulate the liquor business to any extent they
desired, including total prohibition. In Crane v. Campbell (1917), 245 U.S. 304, the Supreme Court affirmed

the constitutionality of an Idaho statute making it unlawful to possess intoxicating liquor for personal use,
That court stated:
"It must now be regarded as settled that,
on account of their well-known noxious qualities
and the extraordinary evils shown by experience
commonly to be consequent upon their use, a state
has power absolutely to prohibit manufacture,
gift, purchase, sale, or transportation of intoxicating liquors within its borders without violating
the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Bartemeyer v. Iowa, 18 \Vall. 129; Beer Company
v. Massachusetts, 97 U.S. 25, 33; Mugler v. KanSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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sas, 123 V.S. 623, 662; Crowley v. Christensen,
137 U.S. 86, 91; Purity Extract Co. v. Lynch, 226
U.S. 192, 201; Clark Distilling Co. v. Western
Jll!aryland Ry. Co., 242 U.S. 311, 320, 321; Seabard Air Line Ry. v. North Carolina, ante, 298.
"As the state has the power above indicated
to prohibit, it may adopt such measures as are
reasonably appropriate or needful to render
exercise of that power effective. * * * "
The Eighteenth Amendment prohibited the manufacture, sale or transportation of "intoxicating liquors.''
The Twenty-first Amendment repealed the Eighteenth
Amendment and provided in Section 2 as follows :
"The transportation or importation into any
State, Territory, or possession of the United
States for delivery or use therein of intoxicating
liquors, in violation of the laws thereof, is hereby
prohibited."
It is clear that the effect of the Twenty-first Amendment

is to restore to the Federal Government and to the
states the respective powers over the manufacture, sale,
distribution, serving and storage, etc., of alcoholic
beverages which they had prior to the Eighteenth
Amendment, except to the extent that the area of state
power is enlarged and that of federal power correspondingly restricted by Section 2.
In Carter v. Virginia, (1944) 321 U. S. 131, it was
held that Virginia could validly require persons shipping
intoxicants through Virginia to post bonds and present
hills of lading showing thP route to be followed, the true
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consignees and that such consignee~ have a legal right
to receive the liquors at the point of destination. The
majority opinion held that these regulatory provisions
were within the state polire power without ever relying
on the Twenty-first An1end1nent. In his concurring
opinion in the Carter case, supra, Justice Black statrd:
"I am not sure that state statutes regulating
intoxicating liquor should ever be invalidated
by this Court under the Com1nerce Clause except
where they conflict with valid federal statutes.
Cf. dissenting opinions, McCarroll v. Dixie Greyhound Lines, 309 U.S. 176, 183; Gwin, White &
Prince v. H enneford, 305 U.S. -t-34 442; Adams
Manufact1tring Co. v. Storen, 304 U.S. 307, 316.
The Twenty-first Amendment has placed liquor
in a category different from that of other articles
of commerce. Though the precise amount of
power it has left in Congress to regulate liquor
under the Com1nerce Clause has not been marked
out by decisions, this much is settled; local, not
national, regulation of the liquor traffic is now
the general Constitutional policy. Ziffrin, Inc.
v. Reeves, 308 U.S. 132: Indianapolis Brewing Co.
v. Liquor Control Comm'n., 305 U.S. 391; State
Board of Equalization v. Young's Market Co.,
299 u.s. 59."
The decisions of the Supreme Court of the United
States since the adoption of the Twenty-first Amendn1ent recognize that the regulatory power of the states
over the importation of alcoholic beverages is free from
limitation by the equal protection clause as well as by
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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the commerce clam;;e of the Constitution. In Mahoney
'l'-

Joseph Triner Corp. (1938), 304 U.S. 401, it was

urged that a local statute requiring registration in
the United States Patent Office of brands of liquors as
a condition precedent to their importation violated the
equal protection clause, where no similar registration
was required of brands locally produced. It was held
that the equal protection clause is not now applicable
to imported intoxicants.

The same conclusion was

reached in State Board of Equalization v. Youngs Mar-

ket Co. (1936), 299 F S. 59,62,63.
In Utah illanufacturers Association v. Stewart, 23
P. 2d 229, at 232, this Court said:

"That the prohibition or regulation of the
manufacture, transportation, sale, and use of
alcohol and other intoxicating liquors is an exercise of the police power of the state admits of no
doubt. 33 C.•J. 505; Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S.
623, 8 S. Ct. 273, 31 L. Ed. 205."
" * • • From the status of alcohol as an
intoxicant and as the hase of various kinds of
intoxicating liquors and beverages, it is apparent that its manufacture, sale, distribution, and
use is subject to regulation and control within
the inherent police power of the state, and the
legislature is competent to exercise this power to
its full extent subject only to limitations or restrictions imposed by the state or United States
Constitution." (Emphasis added.)
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Thus, the State c,f Utah under the police power may
regulate the manufacture, sale, distribution and use of
alcoholic beverages in the State of Utah.
House Bill16 permits certain privileges with respect
to the sale and use of alcoholic beverages, on condition
that the law of the State of Utah not be broken and on
certain other precedent conditions which qualifying nonprofit corporations must meet.
The State of Utah need not bestow any corporation
In Utah with any such privilege, unless it so desires,
and may, under the cases, place whatsoever conditions
on the acquiring of the privilege as the State chooses.
POINT II
HOUSE BILL 16 IS NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND
I.S NOT IN VIOLATION OF ARTICLE VI, SECTION 23 OF
THE CONSTITUTION OF UTAH.

Article VI, .Section 23, of the Constitution of the
State of Utah reads as follows:
"Except general appropriation bills, and bills·
for the codification and general revision of laws,
no bill shall be passed containing more than one
subject, which shall be clearly expressed in its
title."
Plaintiffs raise constitutional objections to House
Bill 16 on the grounds that it contains more than one
subject in the title and in the body thereof. Plaintiffs
argument is apparently based upon the fact that the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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bill regulates and controls nonprofit clubs and also makes
certain provisions with respect to the "locker system."
However, plaintiffs completely overlook the fact that
throughout the bill every provision is directly related
to a nonprofit corporation. There is only one primary
subject treated in this bill within the meaning of the
limitation of Article VI, Section 23, of the Utah Constitution. That subject is "nonprofit corporations." The bill
provides certain privileges for nonprofit corporations
which meet all the requirements imposed upon such corporations. The Legislature selected "nonprofit corporations," creatures of statutory law, and designated them
as the only entity upon which the State of Utah would
confer the privilege of operating a "locker system." As
a condition to the privilege of operating the locker system, certain obligations were imposed.
Cooley's Constitutional Limitations (8th Ed.) \"" ol.
1, at pages 295-297 discuss the purpose of constitutional
provisions similar to Article VI, Section 23, of our Utah
Constitution. We quote in part:
"The general purpose of these provisions is
accomplished when a law suit has but one general
object, which is fairly indicated by its title. To require every e11d and means necessary or convenient for the accon1plishment of this general object
to be provided for by a separate act relating to
that alone would not only be unreasonable, but
would actually render legislation impossible."
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. This Court, in the case of Edler v. Edwards, 34
Utah 13, 95 P. 367, announced the following general
rules as guides in determining whether or not a given
statute meets the requiren1ents of Article VI, Section
23, of the Utah Constitution:
" • • "" ( 1) That the constitutional provision
now under consideration should be liberally construed; (2) that the provision should be applied
so as not to hamper the lawmaking power in framing and adopting comprehensive measures covering a whole subject, the branches of which may be
numerous, but where all have some direct connection with or relation to the principal subject
treated; ( 3) that the constitutional provision
should be so applied as to guard against the real
evil which it was intended to meet; (4) that no
hard and fast rule can be formulated which is
applicable to all cases, but each must to a very
large extent be determined in accordance with
the peculiar circumstances and conditions thereof, and that the decision of the courts are valuable merely as illustrations or guides in applying
these general rules. Moveover, it is now established beyond question that unless the invalidity
of a particular law in question is clearly and
manifestly established the law must prevail as
against such an objection."

Tested by these standards and rules, House Bill 16
does not treat of rnore than one subject. Liquor locker
clubs and the locker system are dealt with only as they
are incidentally related to nonprofit corporations.
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Plaintiffs contend that Section 32-7-3, U.C.A. 1953,
is improperly amended by House Bill 16 and that the
amendment injures and hurts plaintiffs in an unconstitutional manner. Similarly, plaintiffs also contend
that House Bill 16 is discriminatory and a violation of
Article I, Section 24, Utah Constitution, in that it purports to repeal portions of Title 32, U.C.A. 1953, with
relation to certain entities and not to others. Plaintiffs
must show how and in what manner they are injured
by virtue of this alleged condition, which they nowhere
do. Without doing so, they are not entitled to raise the
constitutional question. Even assuming plaintiffs' ability
to show injury, their argument must f.ail Lecause they
are dealing with privileges and not rights. See Utah
Mfrs. Assoc. v. Stewart, supra.
With respect to the manner in which Section 32-7-3,
U.C.A. 1953 is amended by House Bill 16, it is pointed
out that the amendment, if any, is strictly limited to
nonprofit corporations, which are incidentally given the
privilege of holding a federal retail malt liquor revenue
stamp and at the same time they are permitted to allow
members to store liquor on club premises. Prior to the
passage of House Bill 16, Section 32-7-3, U.C.A. 1953
prohibited anyone from storing or permitting others to
store liquor on premises covered by federal retail malt
revenue stamp. In a similar manner, the Utah Legisla-
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ture enacted a law creating the Weber County Irrigation District, which law also incidentally amended other
irrigation and water statutes. The act was challenged
and this Court in State ex rel Cluff, Atty. Gen. v. Weber
County Irrigation District, 218 P. 732, at 734, stated
inter alia as follows :

"Said chapter is, however, an entirely independent act, and no attempt is made therein
to amend other sections of the statutes or other
independent acts. True, it may be that some of
the provisions of chapter 68 may in practice be
found to affect or modify other provisions relating to irrigation or water rights. That, however, is not what the Constitution forbids. Later
laws are frequently enacted which in some way
modify or affect earlier laws relating to the same
subject-matter. That such is the effect of later
enactments is inevitable, and in no way contravenes the constitutional provision that laws shall
be amended only in a particular way. That provision has reference only to direct amendments,
and not to conflirting provisions of separate and
independent acts. See Edler v. Edwards, 34 Utah
13, 95 Pac. 367, and cases there cited. See also
Eden Irr. Co. v. District Court (Utah) 211 Pac.
957."
The ruling of this Court in this case answers in full the
contentions of plaintiffs that the amendment of Sections
32-7-3, and 32-1-8, U.C.A. 1953, is invalid.
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POINT III
HOUSE BILL 16 IS NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS BEING IN VIOLATION OF ARTICLE I, SECTION 24, AND
ARTICLE VI, SECTION 26, SUBDIVISION 16, OF THE CONSTITUTION OF UTAH OR OF SECTION 1 OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES.

In the recent Utah Supreme Court decision involving
the Entre Nous Club, a Utah Corporation v. Lamont F.

Toronto, Sec. of State,

Utah

, 287 P 2d 670,

the Court in holding that Article VI, Section 26, was not
infringed upon by the Legislature when the nonprofit
corporation statute was adopted, stated as follows:
"Appellant further complains that the provision for revocation of the charter of a nonprofit corporation amounts to special legislation,
prohibited by Article VI, Section 26 of the Utah
Constitution. This court has considered the question of reasonable classification innumerable
times, consequently holding that if a reasonable
basis to differentiate, those included from those
excluded frorn the operation of the law can be
found, it must be held constitutional. See Abrahamsen v. Board of Review of Industrial Commission,
Utah
,283 P. 2d 213. The law
granting a charter to nonprofit clubs imposes
upon all of them the duties commensurate with
the rights conferred and provides that the use
of the premises for the violation of law or for
profit-making will result in the revocation of the
~harter."
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Plaintiffs argue against the statute herein on the
theory that it is discriminatory, and that those which
are accorded the privileges granted by the Legislature
must comply with certain statutory prerequisites. Plaintiffs complain that the law is discriminatory because it
requires qualifications that not all may be able to produce. The defendant contends that the operation of this
act is uniform against all whom it endeavors to control
and bless. The defendant contends and urges most
strenuously that no party can successfully attack the
constitutionality of a statute in the absence of a showing
that the said statute actually harms the plaintiff.
This Court in Utah Manufacturers Association v.
Stewart, supra, covered the importance of necessity to
show injury when attacking the constitutionality of a
statute, by saying:
"Plaintiff contends the law is unreasonable
and discriminatory. If this were true, we do not
see how plaintiff can lawfully complain, since
there is no discrimination against it or other
manufacturers who use alcohol, since all are subject to the same regulations."
Clubs and associations of a similar nature are
treated the same by House Bill 16. The bond is the
same for the wealthy and the poor clubs. There is no
privilege extended to the wealthy club that is not also
extended to the poor club. The principle is not unlike
the statutory provision requiring that bonds be purSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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chased by all used car brokers and salesmen; the cost
is the same, despite the wealth possessed by the applicant; the privilege granted to each is the same.
This Court in the case of Utah Manufacturers Assoc.

v. Stewart, supra, carefully sets forth the answer to each
of the contentions 8et forth by plaintiff, and could be
properly quoted extensively. However, defendant refers
the case to the Court as representing a careful analysis
of the extent to which the State may limit or benefit
with regard to sale of intoxicating liquors in the State
of Utah.
Along the same line another more recent Utah case
affirms the principle that the state and its subdivisions
have a peculiar status with respect to the "due process,"
"equal protection of the laws," and other similar constitutional guarantees when the subject matter under
consideration is the privilege to sell or serve liquor or
other alcoholic beverage. \Ve refer to Shaw v. Orem

City (1950), 117 Utah 288, 214 P. 2d 888. The ordinance
in question prohibited the retail sale of light beer on
Sunday in Orem. It was stipulated that other businesses
including retail stores operated on Sunday. The Court
summarily dismissed the contentions of plaintiff that the
ordinance violated the right of plaintiff to acquire,
possess and protect property (Art. I, Sees. 1 and 2, Utah
Constitution), that it violated the constitutional provi-
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sion that all laws of a general nature shall have uniform
operation, (Art. I, Sec. 7, Utah Const.), that it violated
the "due process" clause, (Art. I, Sec. 7, Ftah Const.),
and that it was contrary to the due process clause anrl
the equal protection clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth
An1endments to the Constitution of the United States.
The language of the Court dismissing these constitutional
arguments was brief and to the point. At page 891 the
Court states:
"That the state may prohibit the sale of intoxicating liquors, is too well settled to require
citation of authority. It may delegate such powers
to cities. State v. Briggs 46 Utah 288, 146 P. 261.
Since a light beer may be dealt with by the proper legislative authority in so far as regulation
or prohibition of its sale is concerned, as are
other alcoholic drinks, Riggins, et al. v. District
Court, supra, the authority of the legislature to
enact Sec. 46-0-131 is not open to question."
POINT IV
HOUSE BILL 16 IS NOT INVALID UNDER THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT, SECTION 1, OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, SINCE IT IS NOT UNCERTAIN, AMBIGUOUS OR INCAPABLE OF ENFORCEMENT.

The legislation attacked in this cause of· action places
upon those who would seek to obtain the privileges
granted to nonprofit corporations by the State of Utah
the responsibility to comply with certain standards of
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conduct whieh they themselves are asked to prepare.
As an example,

th~se

privilege seekers are required to

place some limitation upon the number of members
which participate in a social club and the statute states
that the number of members shall be consistent with the
nature and purpose of the association. In other words,
without some limitation upon the number of members, the
association or club could not reasonably be classified as
a social or recreational club or association, and as a
consequence the public in general would be admitted to
the social affairs of the so-called nonprofit corporation,
which the Legislature feels would be contrary to the
best interest of the State of Utah. As a consequence,
the Legislature requires these privilege seekers to establish some limitation upon the number of members
which they will permit to join their particular nonprofit
club or association. Further, the Legislature also requires that these privilege seekers establish in their bylaws a reasonable initiation fee and dues which are
consistent with the nature and purpose of the club or
association. The Legislature had in mind that by doing
so the public in general would be excluded from the
premises, and the nonprofit corporation would sustain
itself through its membership rather than through the
public in general. H.B. 16 also requires that these privilege seekers establish reasonable regulations for the
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dropping of me1nbers for the non-payment of dues or
for other causes and establish strict regulations for the
government of the association for club rooms and quarters generally consistent with the nature and character
of the association or club.
The result of the failure of petitioners for a nonprofit charter to determine what is reasonable with relation to the above referred to requirements is that until
they have established "reasonable" and "strict" rules
and regulations covering the specified subjects set forth
by the Legislature, the Secretary of State is not required to issue a charter by which the said individuals
can obtain the desired privileges. The Legislature was
concerned with two problems when it adopted this sta_tute; (1) the welfare of the public, and (2) the safe conveying of privileges (i.e., liquor locker system and a malt
stamp) to nonprofit corporations which fall within certain, specified categories. It would seem that to successfully maintain that the Legislature had established
an ambiguous and uncertain statute because it requires
of these privilege seekers reasonable regulations with
respect to their club or association, would be to go
beyond a consideration of the welfare of the community.
The case of E:r party Daniels, 183 Calif. 636, 192
P. -t-t2, 21 A.L.R. 1172, holds that a statute prohibiting
''unreasonable" speed in the use of vehicles on the highSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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way is not void for indefiniteness. It would appear that
the Daniels case represents a very strong aversion on
the part of the court to holding a statute unconstitutional
which uses the word ''unreasonable," Despite the fact
that under that statute anyone who was found to be
exceeding an "unreasonable" speed was subject to a
criminal penalty. On the contrary, in the case before
the Court the only p~nalty for a failure of these privilege
seekers to establish "reasonable" rules and regulations
is that they must revise or restate their rules and regulations in such a way as to make them appear reasonable
and consistent with the purpose of which they desire
to be established.
The plaintiffs refer to the Utah case of State v.
Musser, et al., 223 P. 2d 193, in which the Court held
that where a criminal penalty obtains upo_n two or more
persons who "conspire to commit any act injurious to
public morals," such provision is uncertain due to the
fact that the view of the public in general as to what
constitutes an injury to public morals varies from time
to time and from person to person. In the Musser case,
a criminal penalty obtains if a member of the public
fails to interpret what constitutes an injury to the public morals. Obviously, to place such a burden upon the
public would be unconstitutional in view of the uncertainty of defining what is an injury to the public morals.
If the Legislature had required those desiring a non-
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profit corporation eharter for a club or recreational
association, etc., to establish reasonable initiation fees,
reasonable regulations for the dropping of members
without reference to any criterion upon which the word
"reasonable" was dependent, perhaps the criticism that
the Secretary of State could arbitrarily accept or refuse
the rules and regulations of a nonprofit corporation as
being unreasonable would constitute such an uncertainty
that the statute n1ight be classified as unconstitutional.
However, the Legislature states that the reasonable initiation fee must be consistent with the nature and purpose of the association, which provision limits the Secretary of State with regard to being arbitrary in determining what is resonable or unreasonable.
A similar accusation of uncertainty with respect to
statutes which is lwre made by plaintiffs might be directed against any number of existing statutes presently
serving the public of this state. As an example, 16-2-5,
U.C.A. 1953,

r~quires

that incorporators of corpora-

tions for . pecuniary profit, an1ong other things, enter
into an agreement in writing setting forth : "the pursuit
or business agreed upon, specifying it in general terms."
The word "general" would appear in terms of the arguments of plaintiffs to be uncertain in the extreme, though
in reality the term is a necessary guide to those parties
inrorporating under the laws of Utah.
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The 1949 case determined by the United States
Supreme Court, known as American Communications
Assn., 0.1.0. et al., v. Douds, Regional Director of the
National Labor Relations Board, 339 U.S. 382, at page
412, discussed the problem of vagueness and uncertainty
of the statute. The case involved the constitutionality of
the federal statute 1 equiring officers of labor unions to
file "non-communist" affidavits. The statute was attacked for vagueness. Chief Justice Vinson set forth a
test for determining vagueness in the following terms:
"The argument as to vagueness stresses the
breadth of such terms as 'affiliated' 'supports'
and 'illegal or unconstitutional methods.' There
is little doubt that imagination can conjure up
hypothetical cases in which the meaning of these
terms will be in nice question. The applicable
standard, however, is not one of wholly consistent
academic definition of abstract terms. It is,
rather, the practical criterion of fair notice of
those to whom the statute is directed. The particular context is all important."
In the case of Peterson v. Sundt et ux, 67 Ariz. 312,
195 P. 2d 158, beginning at page 162, in which the court
was required to determine whether a statute covering refunds of over $1,000.00 was uncertain and thus void,
the court stated as follows :
"A statute will not be declared void for
vagueness and uncertainty where the meaning
thereof may be implied, or where it employs
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words in common use, or words commonly understood, or words previously judicially defined, or
having settled meaning in law, or a te(·hnical or
other special meaning well enough known to enable persons within the reach of the statute to
apply them correctly, or an unmistakable significance in the connection in which they are employed. In short, legislation othrrwise valid will
not be judicially declared null and void on the
ground that the same is unintelligible and meaningless unless it is so imperfect and so deficient in
its details as to render it hnpossible of e.recution
and enforcement, and is susceptible of no responsible construction that will suz1port and give it
effect, and the court finds itself unable to define
the purpose and intent of the legislature."
In 1951 the case of Clark v. Pasadena, et al., 227 P.
2d 306, where an· interpretation of charter amendments
of the City of Pasadena was at issue, being attacked
as vague and uncertain, the California court stated,
inter alia, as follows:
"That there were difficulties in setting up
such a formula is manifest, but if a practieable
interpretation of the charter amendments can be
found the court must adopt it and sustain the
enactment. A statute wHl not be stricken down
for uncertaintv if a reasonable and usable construction can be given to its language and it will
not be rendered nugatory by the fact that there
may be difficulty in ascertainjng its meaning or
by the possibility· of different interpretations.
County of Tulare v. City of Dinuba, 188 Cal. 664,
(177 -678, 206 p. 983 ...
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"A statute is not necessarily void because it
is vague, indefinite, or uncertain • • • or because
the intention of the legislature might have been
expressed in plainer terms, * • • and opinions
may differ in respect of what falls within its
terms * • * . A statute will not be declared void
for vagueness and uncertainty where the meaning thereof may be implied, • • * ." 50 Am. Jur.,
PP. 489, "Statutes," sec. 473.
POINT V
HOUSE BILL 16 IS CONSTITUTIONAL UNDER ARTICLE V OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF
UTAH AND IS NOT AN INVALID DELEGATION OF A
JUDICIAL FUNCTION.

Plaintiffs claim that the Secretary of State is incapable of determining whether the privilege seeking
corporation is in compliance with the requirements of
law set down by the giver of the privilege. Plaintiffs
state that Article VII, Section 16, of the Constitution
of the State of Utah, and Section 67-2-2, U.C.A. 1953,
limits the duties of the Secretary of State to ministerial
duties solely, and therefore he is not empowered, nor
can he be, to determine in his discretion whether a corporation covered by the provisions of House Bill 16 is
in compliance with the law; and, if determined not to
be so, to cancel the charter of the nonprofit corporation.
Article VII, Section 16, of the Utah Constitution
reads:
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"The Secretary shall keep a record of the
official acts of the Legislature and executive department of the state, and, when required shall
lay the same and all matters relative thereto
before either branch of the legislature, and s·hall
perform such other duties as may be provided
by .law:" (En1phasis added.)
The Legislature under this provision of the Constitution may determine the duties that are to be performed by the Secretary of State, and are not prohibited
from assigning administrative or quasi-judicial duties
to the said officer. Duties of the Secretary of State
heretofore determined by the Legislature, which may
appear to plaintiffs to be solely ministerial, do not magically prohibit the creation of new duties which are of a
different nature. The Supreme Court of Montana in the
case of Barnett Iron Works, Inc., v. Harmon, Secretary
of State, 285 P. 191, after first holding that corporations

"are creatures of the law and come into being only upon
substantial compliance with the statute," went on to state
that:
"While the Secretary of State, in the performance of many of his official functions, is a
mere ministerial officer, yet he is clothed with
quasi-judicial judgment in the organization of
corporations nnder the laws of the state."
The Legislature under the Constitution of Utah
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form such duties as it shall from time to time consider
necessary.
In State v. Stark, 52 P. 2d 890,the Supreme Court
of Montana in questioning the right of the Legislature
to delegate authority, stated:
"Delegation of power to determine who are
within the operation of the law is not a delegation of legislative power. State v. Thompson, 160
Mo. 333, 60 S. W. 1077, 54 L.R.A. 950, 83 Am.
St. Rep. 468. Delegation of power to incorporated
medical societies to appoint medical examiners
to examine and pass upon the fitness of appli- ·
cants to practice medicine is not invalid. Scholle
v. State, 90 Md. 729, 46 A. 326, 50 L.R.A. 411.
But it is essential that the Legislature shall fix
some standard by which the officer or board to
whom the power is delegated may be governed,
and not left to be controlled by caprice. Harmon
v. State, 66 Ohio St. 249, 64 N.E. 117, 53 L.R.A.
618. 'The Legislature cannot delegate its power
to make a law, but it can make a law to delegate
a power to determine some fact or state of things
upon which the law makes, or intends to make,
its own action depend. To deny this would be to
stop the wheels of government.' Field v. Clark,
143 U.S. 649, 694, 12 S. Ct. 495, 505, 36 L. Ed.
294; United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506, 31
S. Ct. 480, 55 L. Ed. 563."
The case of Entre N ous Club, a Utah corporation,
v. Lamont F. Toronto, Secretary of State, supra, discusses the constitutionality of 16-6-13, U.C.A. 1953,
with respect to the conferring of judicial power upon
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the Secretary of State, and the Court in that case, holding that the statute was constitutional, stated a~ follows:
"The constitutionality of U.C.A. 1953, 16-6-13,
was tested in the case of Citizen's Club v. Welling,
83 Utah 81, 27 P. 2d 23, a unanimous court holding that the statute was not unconstitutional ns
conferring judicial power upon the Secretary of
State. This was not a trial for crilnes committed
by the club or its agents, but merely the enforC'f'ment of statutory civil consequences of the violation of duties under the club charter."
The case of Cifi.zen' s Club v. Welling, 83 Utah 81,
27 P. 2d 23, nicely p0inted out the illogic of arguing that
the Legislature had wrongfully delegated a judicial function, by use of the following language:
"To hold that the act here in question is invalid because conferring judicial power upon the
Secretary of State in violation of the constitutional provisions, requires a holding that the acts
of the Legislature conferring power and discretion upon the various hoards and commisRions
referred to, likewise are invalid because conferring judicial power upon them in violation of the
Constitution. The contrary has been held by this
court and so are the authorities generally."
POINT VI
HOUSE BILL 16 DOES NOT VIOLATE ARTICLE I,
SECTION 18, UTAH CONSTUTION, IN THAT IT DOES NOT
IMPAIR THE OBLIGATION OF CONTRACTS.

Plaintiffs raise the further objection to House Bill
16 in that "it impairs the obligation of contracts both
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now existing and fl,ture." This argument is fully disposed of by the ruling of this Court in the case of
Riggins v. District Court of Salt Lake County, 89 Utah
183, 51 P. 2d 645. In that case, plaintiffs had beer
licenses when the Legislature enacted a new law, which
in effect cancelled the existing licenses. We quote this
Court's discussion on this problem as follows:

"It is next contended on behalf of plaintiffs
that their licenses, issued under the law of 1933,
are valid notwithstanding the enactment of the
Liquor Control Act of 1935. The textwriters and
adjudicated cases generally do not support but
are against that contention.
'A license to sell liquor is revoked or annulled by the repeal of the law authorizing the
grant of such licenses, or by any change in the
legislation of the state or district inconsistent
with the further exercise of the right conferred
by the license, such as the adoption of a prohibitory statute or a local option law: 33 C.J. 565.
To the same effect is the text in 33 C.J. 622
and 37 C.J. 246. In 17 R.C.L. p. 476, it is said:
Following the general principle that a license is
not a contract, it is clear that it does not in itself
create any vested right, or permanent right, and
that free latitude is reserved by the legislature
to impose new or additional burdens on the licensee, or to alter the license, or to revoke or annul
it. And this is the general rule notwithstanding
the expenditure of money by the licensee in reliance thereon, and regardless of whether the term
for which the lirensP was given has expired.'
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Cases which support the foregoing texts will
be found collected in footnotes thereto. Even
though licenses should be held to be entitled to
the same standing in law as contracts, which they
are not, still it was competent for the Legislature
under its police power to nulHfy the lirenses
theretofore issued. We quote from 1 Cooley's
Constitutional Limitations (8th Ed.) at page 36:
'Equally incumbent upon the State legislature
and these municipal bodies is the restriction that
they shall adopt no irrepealable legislation. No
legislative body ran so part with its powerR by
any proceeding as not to be able to continue the
exercise of th~m. It can and should exercise them
again and again, as often as the public interests
require. Such a body has no power, even by Contract, to control and embarrass its legislative
power and duties."
"Quoting further from the same volume at
page 579 it is said: 'It would seem, therefore,
to be the prevailing opinion, and one based upon
sound reason, that the State cannot barter away,
or in any manner abridge or weaken, any of those
essential powers which are inherent in all governments, and the existence of which in full vigor
is important to the well-being of organized society; and that any contracts to that end are void
upon general principles, and cannot be saved from
invalidity by the provision of the national Constitution. • • • '
This court in a number of cases has held that
a contract although valid when made must give
way to ·the proper exercise of the police powers
of the lawn1aking body. Among the cases so holdSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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ing are: City of St. George v. Public Utilities
Commission, 62 Utah 453, 220 P. 720, and Retan
v. Salt Lake City, 63 Utah 459, 226 P. 1095."
Plaintiffs are denied the right to farm out the sale
of food and beverages by contract, only if they choose
voluntarily on their own part to maintain premises upon
which liquor is or will be sold or stored. As this Court
said in the language just quoted from the Riggins case,
"a contract although valid when made must give way to
the proper exercise of the police powers of the law making body." See also Advertiser Co. v. State, 69 So. 501
(Ala. 1915), particularly at 503.
POINT VII
HOUSE BILL 16 IS NOT CONTRARY TO ARTICLE I,
SECTION 9, CONSTITUTION OF UTAH, IN THAT IT DOES
NOT PROVIDE FOR AN EX.CESSIVE AND UNREASONABLE FINE UPON A LIMITED GROUP.

As has been stated, the State of Utah will confer
a privilege upon those who wish to take upon themselves the precedent conditions determined by the State.
The State has jealously guarded the privilege bestowed
by House Bill 16 and has stated to all those that might
seek after the privilege, that if they misuse it they shall
be bound unto the State of the sum of $5,000.00. Since
the State of Utah has exclusive control over the privilege,
cases supra, they may require any conditions they choose
4lt those who seek to l' btain the said privilege.
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The plaintiffs have said that the $5,000.00 bond
represents an excessive fine. In fact, the bond is in tl1r
form of a penal bond to which the nonprofit corporation
is bound. The case of Fresh Grown Preserves Corporation et al., v. United States, 144 F. 2nd 136, at page 139,
which discusses the forfeiture of penal bonds, states as
follows:
"The authorities are clear that where a bond
is given to a public body as a condition on a
compliance with law, the full penalty of such bond
may be recovered for a breach thereof, in the
absence of statutory provision to the contrary.
Clark v. Barnard, 108 U.S. 436, 2 S. Ct. 878, 27
L. Ed. 780; United States v. Dieckerhoff 202 U.S.
302, 26 S. Ct. 604, 50 L. Ed. 1041 Eagle Indemnity
Co. v. United States, Supra."
House Bill 16 affirmatively requires a forfeiture of
the sum of the bond. In the Preserves case, supra, the
court upheld the automatic forfeiture of a penal bond.
The court quoted from the Dieckerhoff case by using the
following language:
"But we think the purpose of the statute and
the purpose of the requirement in the bond provided for therein, and the one given in this case,
was to secure the performance of the duty imposed of returning the package or packages,
where an importer availed himself of the privilege
of withdrawing merchandise from the custody
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of the government officials before it has been
examined and appraised. • • • We think such
undertaking, for this manner of discharging this
duty, or praying the value stipulated, was intended to and does relieve the government from
the necessity of showing any actual damage or
loss." (Emphasis added).
This Court in the Entre N ous case, supra, has already stated that revoking the charter of the club is
reasonable and that a club is a proper subject for regulation, and it is the corporation that is being penalized
by the revoking and not the members, thereof. The bond
required by House Bill 16 also runs from the club to the
State of Utah, and is a condition to receiving the privilege. The Legislature has determined the sum of
$5,000.00 to be reasonable damage to the State upon
misuse of the granted privilege by the club.

CONCLUSION
House Bill16 is a statute which permits the bestowal
of the liquor locker privilege and the federal malt stamp
privilege upon nonprofit corporations.
The State of Utah, realizing the temptations existing coincident with the possession of such a privilege
(i.e., the desire to invite the public so that the coffers
will be full; the temptation to use the nonprofit corporation for the sole purpose of obtaining the privilege,
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while contracting the privilege, the concessions, Pte., to
profit-making groups; the keeping of two sets of books;
the attraction of liquor and then establishing gambling,
or permitting it etc.) has carefully provided a set of conditions which are designed to protect the health and welfare of the community while permitting the privilege.
Since the right to control and regulate liquor is
possessed exclusively by the State, under the police
power, this Honorable Court should sustain House Bill
16 as a proper regulation by the State of Utah.
Respectfully submitted,
E. R. CALLISTER
Attorney General
DONN E. CASSITY
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Defendants
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